Abstract. The paper presents an approach to analysis of substitution boxes (S-boxes) 
Introduction
The Substitution Block (S-box) is the fundamental cryptographic component which plays an important role in fulfilling the Shannon's property of confusion in block ciphers. In the two major design strategies for block ciphers, Feistel networks and Substitution/Permutation networks, the S-boxes form the only non-linear part of a block cipher. The strength of the cipher to a great extent depends on the quality of the used s-box (s-boxes).
An S-box takes some number of input bits, m, and transforms them into some number of output bits, n, where n is not necessarily equal to m. An m×n S-box can be implemented as a lookup table with 2 m words of n bits each. The problem to find optimal S-boxes is hard due to the fact that the number of permutations mapping m-bits to nbits is very big even for small values of m. Therefore exhaustively checking all permutations to find good S-boxes is not practical for m > 4 [1] .
In practice S-boxes are either designed or generated randomly. In each case it is important to evaluate the S-box quality.
Previous work
The most important property of the S-box is robustness against known attacks (eg. differential and linear cryptanalysis) and attacks which may be invented in the future.
A number of properties have been proposed to measure cryptographic quality of S-boxes. For example: nonlinearity [2] , correlation immunity [2] , algebraic degree [3] , resilience [4] , robustness to differential cryptography [5] , fixed points and opposite fixed points [6] .
Over 20 parameters have been proposed so far and because of the problem complexity it is still possible to develop new measures. For example the open source tool for S-boxes analysis "S-box, SET, Match" [7] computes 17 parameters.
In some cases the design criteria and the process of the S-box crafting remain undisclosed. In such case we may try some sort of reverse engineering [8] .
Motivation
Let us consider a substitution/permutation network shown in Fig.1 . It is a 64-bit subblock of the PP-1 cipher [9] .
In each round a 64-bit subblock is processed as eight 8-bit subblocks by four types of transformations, 8 × 8 Sboxes S, XOR [⊕], addition [+] and subtraction [-] . Two round keys k' and k" are applied in each round. It is well known that one round block cipher can be easily broken (e.g., only 2 pairs of plaintext-ciphertext are required to break one round AES [10] ). Let us assume that by inserting fault (faults) we have changed the circuit functionality in such a way that it produces a result which corresponds to a one round version of the cipher with the same key.
To evaluate to what extent this can be useful for breaking the cipher we need to find answers to two questions: "what is the probability of obtaining such a result?", and "how many results are required to break the cipher?" Let us consider in detail the second problem. As we can see in Fig. 1 , there are 2 round keys applied in each round. Therefore we can expect that breaking the one round version of the cipher, using pairs plaintext-ciphertext, will be more complicated than in a cipher with one round key in each round (e.g., the AES).
There are 3 sort of operations in the circuit: xorsubstitution-xor, addition-substitution-subtraction, and subtraction-substitution-addition. Where addition and subtraction are performed modulo 2 8 . Let us assume that we have two different pairs plaintext ciphertext (m 1 ,c 1 ) (m 2 ,c 2 ) for round 1. For xor-S-xor section we have a system of equations: (1)
Similarly, for plus-S-minus section we have: (2)
For minus-S-plus we obtain (3)
We know m 1 , c 1 , m 2 , c 2 and we want to find k 1 , k 2 . The problem is: how many solutions exist for systems of equations (1), (2) , and (3)?
The answer is not obvious because of the nonlinear element S presented in Fig. 2 [9] . Table 1 . For plus-S-minus and minus-S-plus we have no solutions or 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 o 6 or 7 solutions. Examples of solutions are presented in Table 2 . Frequency distribution of solutions for xor-xor, plusminus, and minus-plus operations are presented in tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively. So far we have considered solutions for each 8-bit section separately. Now we can evaluate the number of solutions which must be checked to break the cipher. As we can see in Fig.1 there are 4 xor-S-xor sections, 2 plus-S-minus sections, and 2 minus-S-plus sections.
Let us suppose that we have found such round keys (concatenated k 1 ad k 2 for each section) that equations (1), (2) , and (3) are satisfied.
For each xor-S-xor 2 or 4 solutions are possible. For plus-S-minus and minus-S-plus sections 1-7 solutions are possible. The smallest number of k 1 and k 2 combinations which must be checked is:
The biggest number of k 1 and k 2 combinations which must be checked is:
Frequency distribution of equations (1) to (3) solutions depends on the substitution S. We will address this problem in the next section. 0  786826752  791054336  783888128  1  779616768  778941440  790350848  2  406228224  398291456  394428928  3  127938048  129255424  131347968  4  30849024  33688064  31411968  5  6136320  6199296  6199296  6  1369344  1599488  1142272  7  130560  65536  260608  8 65024
Solutions for different S-boxes
It turns out that the number of solutions which satisfy equations (1) to (3) depends on the substitution S. The same holds for frequency distribution. Frequency distributions for equations (2) and (3) are very similar. Therefore we will focus on equations (1) and (2) .
Frequency distribution of solutions for xor-S-xor and plus-S-minus for AES [11] , Skipjack [12] , and Pi [13] Sboxes are presented in tables 6 and 7.
As we can see, the frequency distribution of solutions of equations (1) and (2) differs significantly for each of the considered s-boxes.
Linear transformation of S-box (e.g. XORing with a constant) does not change the frequency distributions of considered systems of equations. For example the S-box shown in Fig.3 . was obtained by xoring each element of S-box S (Fig. 2 ) with 0x53. Frequency distribution of solutions for modified S-box is the same as for the original S-box (presented in tables 3, 4, and 5).
An approach to S-box evaluation
Let us consider a more general version of encryption network - Fig. 4 . We take into account only one section with a single S-box. The whole network consists of many sections -similarly to those shown in Fig. 1 . Operations OP1 and OP2 are two-argument operations such as xor, addition modulo 2 n , subtraction modulo 2 n , etc. Any reversible two-argument operation may be used. S is a n×n substitution box (S-box); k 1 and k 2 are n-bit fragments of round keys k' and k" . In the next part we will limit ourselves to xor-xor operations. We will use 8×8 S-boxes as an example.
Let us take a set of randomly generated 8×8 S-boxes as a reference point. For a sample of 100 random s-boxes the observed number of solutions was 10 or 12 or 14. The frequency distribution of the number of solutions is presented in Fig. 5 . Fig.5 . Frequency distribution of solutions for randomly generated Sboxes; xor-xor operations.
As we can see, in considered sample we don't observe less than 10 solutions and more than 14 solutions.
Frequency distribution of solutions for randomly generated S-boxes is presented in Table 8 . Let us compute for each number of solutions Let us now apply our approach to a few S-boxes. First let us consider a S-box presented in Fig. 7 . To check the cryptographic properties of the S-box we may apply a set of tests [7] . Selected results are presented below:
S-box is balanced. Nonlinearity is 94. Algebraic degree is 7. Algebraic immunity is 4. Transparency order is 7.813. Number of fixed points is 0. Number of opposite fixed points is 0.
From these results w cannot deduce whether the S-box was generated randomly or constructed in some other way. Now let us find the frequency distribution of solutions for xor-xor operations. For each number of solutions we compute:
where N is measured absolute frequency of solutions and Average is average absolute frequency of solutions for random S-boxes. Results are presented in Fig. 8 . As we can see, there are small values of e for small number of solutions and much greater for bigger number of solutions. It is a typical pattern for randomly generated S-boxes. Conclusion: with high probability the S-box is random. In fact this S-box was generated randomly.
Indeed the S-box in Fig. 10 is a modified AES S-box proposed by Fuller and Millan [14] . Finally, let us consider a S-box presented in Fig.11 . To start with, let us analyze this S-box using S-box, SET, Match tool [7] . We obtain the following results:
Nonlinearity is 82. Algebraic degree is 7.
Number of fixed points is 3. Composite algebraic immunity is 4. Robustness to differential cryptanalysis is 0.500.
However is not obvious whether the S-box is generated randomly or obtained in some other way. Let us find the frequency distribution of solutions for xor-xor operations for this S-box. Results are presented in Table 9 . As we can see in Table 9 the distribution is very unusual. For some m and c values we can find as much as 128 solutions for k 1 and k 2 . With high probability the S-box is based on some simple mathematic formula.
Indeed this is one of two Safer-64 [15] S-boxes denoted as log 45 S-box. It is computed as follows [15] 
Concluding remarks
The proposed method may be used to get some insight in the S-box which design criteria are unknown. It may also be used to reason about the S-box properties. S-boxes with similar frequency distribution of solutions may have similar cryptographic properties.
Finding all the solutions is time consuming. For example for 8×8 S-box solving all the xor-xor equations requires 350 seconds of computation on 4-core Xeon 3.4 GHz processor. Approximately 310 seconds takes finding solutions for plusminus operations.
In many cases we can consider some limited number of randomly selected data. From tables 6, 7 and 9 we can deduce that even for only 10 6 solutions we can still obtain valuable results. In such a case computations require a few seconds.
The randomly selected data is the only practical approach for bigger e.g. 16×16 S-boxes.
